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William Panton, British Merchant and Politico:
Negotiating Allegiance in the Spanish and
Southern Indian Borderlands, 1783-1801
by David N arrett
lliam Panton and his business partner John Leslie were
the most politically adept merchants of Florida's shores
from the height of the American Revolutionary War until
the close of the eighteenth century. Renowned for their mastery
of the Indian trade, they were native Scots who exemplified their
country's rising place in the British Empire over distant comers of
the globe. Immigrating to South Carolina in the early 1770s, both
men did business there and in neighboring Georgia, where Panton
came to reside. While they may not have known each other personally at the time, the war would bring them together. After the outbreak of hostilities, Panton and Leslie remained steadfastly loyal to
the king. Escaping American Whig harassment, each found refuge
by fleeing southward to East Florida-a colony that had come into
the British Empire by the peace of 1763 ending the Seven Years'
War. 1

W:

David Narrett is a Professor of History at the University of Texas at Arlington. He
received his Ph.D. in history from Cornell University in 1981. He is the author of
two books, Inheritance and Family Life in Colonial New York City ( 1992) and Adventurism and Empire: The Struggle for Mastery in the Louisiana-Florida Borderlands, 1763-1803
(2015). The author thanks Paul E. Hoffman, Ben Huseman, and David LaFevor for
their helpful insights on this essay.
1
Panton was born in Aberdeenshire, Scotland, during the early 1740s. John
Leslie, a native of Moray County, was born on October 13, 1749. See William
S. Coker and Thomas D. Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands: Panton, Leslie and Company and john Forbes and Company, 1783-1847
(Pensacola: University Presses of Florida, 1986), 15-27. For Scotland's place
within the British Empire, see Linda Colley, Britons: Forgi,ng the Nation, 17071837 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992); Ned C. Landsman, ed.,
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British East Florida and neighboring West Florida appeared
safe Tory havens in 1776, but that security was short-lived. Spain's
entry into the war against Britain in 1779 brought decisive changes.
From September 1779 to May 1781 Spanish forces under Louisiana
Governor Bernardo de Galvez successively captured Baton Rouge,
Mobile, and Pensacola in West Florida. Although East Florida was
still in British hands, George Ill's government did not consider it
sufficiently valuable to keep when peace was made in 1 783. Both
"Floridas"-as Britons called the two colonies-were ceded to
Spain by the Treaty of Paris. This turn of events threatened all
that Florida Loyalists had built. Panton and Leslie felt the sting
of defeat after years of involvement in the deerskin trade-a commerce in which Tory merchants supplied Britain's southern Indian allies with arms and goods in the fight against Americans and
Spaniards. Toward the war's end, the two men and three associates
formed a business partnership-Panton, Leslie and Companythat was placed in immediate jeopardy by impending British imperial withdrawal. 2
Under the Treaty of Paris, British subjects in the Floridas had
eighteen months to settle their affairs before departing Spanish
territory. While Madrid subsequently extended this deadline, the
great majority of Britons and Anglo-American Loyalists had left
East Florida by late 1785. Panton and Leslie remained, however,
by persuading Spanish authorities that their commercial experience was indispensable for Madrid to gain southern Indian loyalty
and to stave off United States expansionism. Through this political
success, Panton, Leslie and Company consolidated trading posts by
the St. Johns River near the Atlantic and St. Marks (San Marcos)
along the Gulf Coast. By 1785, Panton opened business at Pensacola, which soon became his headquarters. His associate Thomas
Forbes, a fellow Scots Loyalist, managed the firm's operations at
Nassau in the Bahamas-a key link in transatlantic commerce. The
partners continued to specialize in the deerskin trade that had tied
southern Native peoples to European markets for decades. From
Nation and Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600-1800

2

(Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2001).
Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 35-36, 42. For a discussion of the Treaty of
Paris of 1783, and its impact on Florida, see David Narrett, Adventurism and
Empire: The Struggle for Mastery in the Louisiana-Ronda Borderlands, 1762-1803

(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 109-114; J. Leitch
Wright Jr., Ronda in the American Revolution (Gainesville: University Presses of
Florida, 1975), 120-124.
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an Indian perspective, deer pelts translated into valued goodscloth and blankets, metal tools and cookware, iron hatchets, guns
and munitions, and rum. 3
The most meticulous study of Panton, Leslie and Company
remains William S. Coker's and Thomas D. Watson's Indian Traders
of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands ( 1986) . Following this pioneering work, historians have examined the deerskin trade's longterm impact on Indian economic dependency and indebtedness. 4
Panton, Leslie and Company certainly exacerbated these difficulties, if their business is viewed from its end point rather than its
original aims. John Forbes, the principal heir to Panton and Leslie, used the firm's credits against Native peoples to win a cession
of one million acres from the Lower Creeks and Seminoles in 1804.
The U.S. government extracted huge territories from the Chickasaws and Choctaws the next year in exchange for monetary payments, including sums assigned to pay off Indian debts to Forbes
and associates. Cherokee and Upper Creek land cessions to the
United States in 1805 brought more money to Forbes by a similar though more drawn-out process. While Panton died in 1801
and was not directly involved in these arrangements, he laid the
groundwork for Forbes's huge windfalls at Native expense. 5

3

4

For the British evacuation, see Caroline Watterson Troxler, "Loyalist Refugees
and the British Evacuation of East Florida, 1783-1785," Florida Historical Quarterly, 60, no. 1 Quly 1981): 1-27. For the deerskin trade, see Coker and Watson,
Indian Traders, 43-48, 51-52, 63-72; Kathleen E. Holland Braund, Deerskins and
Duffels: The Creek-Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815 (1993; 2d ed., Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 35-39, 67-74, 96-102; Greg O'Brien,
Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750-1830 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 2002), 86-97.
For Indian economic dependency and cultural change, see Claudio Saunt, A
New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek Indians,
1733-1816 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 143-150, 221228; J. Leitch Wright Jr., Creeks and Seminoles: The Destruction and Regeneration
of the Muscogulge People (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 51-63,
81-82, 121-125, 146-150; Richard White, The R.oots of Dependency: Subsistence,
Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lin-

coln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 89-96; Roger G. Kennedy, Mr.

Jef

ferson s Lost Cause: Land, Farmers, and the Louisiana Purchase (New York: Oxford

5

University Press, 2003), 131-133, 144-147, 161-165.
See Coker and Watson Indian Traders, 226-230, 250-265. For the U.S. policy
to insure the payment of Indian debts through the Chickasaw and Choctaw
treaties, see Secretary of War James Dearborn to James Robertson and Silas
Dinsmoor, March 20, 1805, American State Papers, Indian Affairs, 1: 700, 750.
Forbes's demands on the Creeks and Seminoles, and his company's painstaking negotiations with the United States through 1815, are discussed in Wright,
Creeks and Seminoles, 147-150, 183, 191-193.
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Panton, Leslie and Company Headquarters, Pensacola, built ca. 1796. Courtesy of
the State Archives of Florida.

The Indian land cessions were of great consequence, though
Panton, Leslie and Company had no such scheme in view through
its first decade of operations under the Spanish crown. During this
period, the firm greatly expanded its commerce by supplying Indian peoples holding their ground against the United States. At its
apex, the merchant House of Panton, Leslie and Company acted
more like a transnational corporation than a simple business partnership. By the mid-l 790s, the firm had a political and commercial
impact felt within all major southern Indian societies and across
territories disputed between Spain and the United States. However
formidable, the company's principals could never rest easy given
the hazards of frontier turmoil and international upheaval. Panton's emergence as a power broker had sharply aggressive features
but also a defensive character that should not be underestimated.
The pursuit of profit coincided with the quest for viable structures
of law and authority in turbulent borderlands where state power
was tenuous. 6
6

Eighteenth-century American borderlands had several characteristics, notably
contested borders among rival Indian peoples, colonials and indigenous societies, and between competing empires. See Pekka Hamalainen and Samuel
Truett, "On Borderlands," Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (September
2011) : 360. James G. Cusick insightfully argues that East and West Florida
of the post-Revolutionary War era were borderlands where "basic authority...
was always subject to challenge, not so much by the oppressed as by the discontented and ambitious." See Cusick "Some Thoughts on Spanish East and
West Florida as Borderlands," Florida Historical Quarterly 90, no. 2 (Fall 2011):
140-141, 144.
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This essay examines the critical issue of how William Panton
gradually recast the legal foundations that defined how his company managed Indian commerce under the Spanish crown. Panton
and Leslie officially maintained a form of hybrid political loyalty.
Acting for themselves and their Florida employees, the partners
pledged fidelity to the Spanish king even while reserving their
national allegiance to Great Britain. While Leslie managed business at St. Augustine and northward by the St. Johns River, Panton headed operations along the Gulf Coast, where the company's
trade penetrated most deeply into southern continental zones. A
lifelong bachelor, he was a hard-driving man who generally took
the political lead for his firm. Spanish officials recognized this fact
by commonly referring to the company as la Casa de Panton-the
House of Panton. Panton and Leslie safeguarded their British allegiance for good reason. While national pride was at stake, they valued England as their source of credit, supply of goods, and outlet
for deerskins. 7
Panton's quest for profit within a stable legal order reminds
us that the American Revolutionary era was defined not simply by
the language of natural rights but by a still older English political
discourse-the idea of protection and allegiance as the foremost
bond between sovereign and subjects. According to this theory,
the monarch had a claim on the loyalty of subjects; the people
had a reciprocal claim on their sovereign who was duty-bound to
respect their persons and property within the course of law. In the
wake of British defeat in the Revolutionary War, American Loyalists
put their own spin on this doctrine by asserting the dutiful subject's
right to government compensation for personal losses sustained at
the hands of rebels. 8
7

8

Leslie also had a store at the St. Marys River from 1791 to 1793. For the firm's
storehouses, see Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 365. "Casa de Panton" is
a commonplace phrase, especially in the correspondence of Louisiana's governors and officials. See, for example, Carondelet (governor of Louisiana)
to Aranda, August 28, 1792, Archivo Hist6rico Nacional, Estado [hereafter
AHN/E], legajo 3898. Documents in AHN/E are available on microfilm in
the Williams Research Center, The Historic New Orleans Collection (hereafter
THNOC.)
MayaJasanoff, Liberty'.s Exiks, American Layalists in the Revolutionary World (New
York: Vintage, 2011), 121-123; Edward Countryman, Americans: A Collision of
Histories (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), 64-66; Carole Watterson Troxler,
"Refuge, Resistance, and Reward: The Southern Loyalists' Claim on East Florida," Journal of Southern History 55, no. 4 (November 1989): 592-596; Wright,
Florida in the American Revolution, 140-142. For the American patriot view of
protection and allegiance, see James H. Kettner, The Development of American
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East Florida Tories believed the mother country owed them
special consideration because their province was ceded to the
Spanish even though it was unconquered. In an anonymous pamphlet produced in 1784, several Florida Loyalists admitted that the
king had the prerogative to "dismember this Province from the
Empire," but contended that "the [lawful] Subject" could not be
"divested of his property ... by the Crown or Legislature, without
receiving an Equivalent for it." Since "the Inhabitants of East-Florida" had "faithfully discharged all the duties ofliege Subjects," they
should be compensated by the British treasury not only for wartime
losses, but for being compelled to relinquish properties in ceded
crown territory. 9 Wartime flight and postwar exile added force to
the East Florida Tory argument. After the British army's evacuation
of Charleston and Savannah in 1782, about 5,000 white Loyalists,
fleeing with 8,000 enslaved blacks, had poured into the province.
The peace treaty compelled still another removal for Tory exiles
and for blacks whose life course was imposed by masters. 10
Anticipating the arrival of Spanish government, Panton and
Leslie and their Scots Loyalist partners forwarded financial claims
to England based on their wartime collaboration and sacrifices.
Although these appeals are not fully documented, the petitions
undoubtedly accounted for abandoned and confiscated properties
in Whig South Carolina and Georgia as well as losses sustained in
Florida. Both Panton and Leslie obtained compensation for their
joint efforts, if not the full requested amount. Panton's demands
on the British government set an important precedent for his
firm's subsequent demands on Spain. 11
It was not until July 1784-more than a year after the peace
treaty-that Spanish Governor Vicente Manuel de Zespedes took

9

10

11

Citizenship, 1608-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978),
165-170.
Anonymous, The Case of the Inhabitants ofEast-Florida. With an Appendix, Containing Papers, by which all the Facts Stated in the Case, are Supported (St. Augustine,
1784), 5, (last quotation in paragraph), 6-7 (first two quotations in paragraph).
For an astute analysis of this pamphlet, see Troxler, "Refuge, Resistance, and
Reward," 591-594.
The precise number of refugees toward the war's end is not known. See Troxler, "Refuge, Resistance, and Reward," 581-584; Wright, Florida in the American
Revolution, 126-127.
For the claims, see Wilbur Henry Siebert, Loyalists in East Florida, 1774 to 1785,
2 vols. (1929, reprint, Boston: Gregg Press, 1972), 2: 276, 365-366; Coker and
Watson, Indian Traders, 44-45; Wright, Florida in the American Revolution, 140142; J. Barton Starr, Tories, Dons, and Rebels: The American Revolution in British
WestRorida (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976), 234-240.
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P.F. Tarclieu, Carte de la Floride et de la Georgi,e, ca. 1780-1 782. Map shows Florida and
Georgia in relation to the Bahamas, Louisiana, and southern Indian lands. Map is
courtesy of the State Archives of Florida.

command at St. Augustine with several hundred troops. While
a few Anglo diehards mulled revolt against the new regime, the
majority prepared to leave the colony in due time. To some Britons, exodus was a moral and legal obligation. The same Florida
pamphleteers who insisted on the sanctity of Loyalist property
rights also declared that Britons could never be justified in becoming Spanish vassals. If attaching themselves to Spain, they would
lose their "invaluable birth-right and immunities," and be exposed
to Catholic conversion-a possibility that the Protestant publicists
contemptuously dismissed. Every Briton had an unalterable duty:
"No time, no place, no circumstances, can enable him to shake off
his natural allegiance, without the consent of his Sovereign. "12
Panton was a stout British patriot in sentiment. On June 4,
1784, he celebrated George III's birthday at a friendly gathering
with Indian men, most likely Lower Creeks and Seminoles, at his
Wakulla River storehouse near Apalachee Bay. As Panton recollected later that year, the festivities at the storehouse had an air of
12

The Case of the Inhabitants ofEast-Florida, 10-12.
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"melancholy reflection" for him. A Spanish governor was about to
arrive at St. Augustine, and Panton did not presume his firm would
remain in business. He toasted George Ill's goodness to his "Red
Children," but personally bemoaned the British ministry's sacrifice of "an immense territory." 13 Southern Indians could no longer
count on the English monarch in the defense of their homelands.
Britain's former Indian allies were compelled as much as white
Loyalists to establish new bonds of protection and allegiance. 14
Although disturbed by the British cession, Panton resolved
with Leslie to petition for continued residency in Florida under
Spanish rule. Patrick Tonyn, East Florida's outgoing British governor, lobbied Zespedes on behalf of the Scots partners who had
given him fulsome wartime support. In 1777, a host of East Florida
Loyalists, including Panton and Leslie, pronounced themselves
"Enemies to Sedition and Rebellion, "and friends to "the Constitution of our Country": "[W] e are ready and willing to Cooperate .. .in
support of the Honour, and Dignity of the Crown, at the Expence
of our Lives and Fortunes." 15
As merchants with a vested stake in Indian commerce, Panton
and Leslie went against the grain of diehard British patriotism by
deciding to reside in a Spanish colony. Just as important, their
bid ran contrary to Madrid's law of the Indies that prohibited foreign merchants from trading with the crown's overseas dominions.
Since the mid-sixteenth century, Spain had tried mightily, though
unsuccessfully, to suppress contraband traffic by which British and
other foreign shippers employed ruse and bribe to pry open Hispanic American colonies that abounded in silver and other riches.
Smuggling thrived through powerful economic pulls-ties between
13

14

15

Panton to Thomas Forbes, November 20, 1784, The Papers of Panton, Leslie
and Company (cited hereafter as PLC), reel 1. The Papers are part of the
Panton Leslie and Company Collection, 1739-1847, University of West Florida,
University Archives and West Florida History Center (microfilm at Mary Couts
Burnett Library, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth).
For the Indian response to the Treaty of 1783, see Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 273-276; Kathleen
DuVal, Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution (New York:
Random House, 2015), 236--238, 256--269.
See Tonyn to Arturo O'Neill, September 19, 1783, in Joseph Byrne Lockey, East
Florida: 1783-1785: A Fi/,e of Documents Assemb/,ed, and Many of Them Translated,
ed.John Walton Caughey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), 190.
For quotation, see "Copy of an Address from the Inhabitants of the Province
of East Florida, and Refugees from the neighbouring Provinces ... to Patrick
Tonyn [1777]," PLC, reel 1.
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contrabandistas and Hispanic colonists eager to buy wares that peninsular Spain could not sufficiently supply. Notwithstanding the
volume of illicit trade, there was a significant precedent of licensed
English participation in Spanish colonial commerce. In 1713, the
British South Sea Company obtained the asiento--a monopoly on
the sale of African slaves to Hispanic America. Disputes over the
company's privileges were a significant cause of the Anglo-Spanish
war of 1739-1743 ("the War ofJenkins' Ear"). The South Sea Company did not survive the conflict, but smuggling continued during
the fighting and well beyond the war's end. 16
While Zespedes countenanced a small Anglo minority in and
about St. Augustine, he was adamantly opposed to foreign adventurers who plotted Florida colonization beyond royal control. One
audacious schemer was the eccentric John Cruden, a Tory exile who
aspired to establish an Anglo Loyalist colony on Florida's northern
frontier for the purpose of thwarting U.S. invasion. Rebuffed in his
appeals for Spanish approval, Cruden finally settled for life in the
Bahamas-a frequent destination for East Florida's Anglo refugees. 17
Zespedes's determination to combat lawlessness worked to
the advantage of Panton and Leslie who gave every appearance
of being respectable merchants. Besides, the governor had little
alternative, and he was already heavily indebted to Leslie for provisioning his garrison and providing royal gifts to Native peoples.
Spanish merchants were not involved in Florida's Indian trade,
which was considered essential to securing Native allies for the
crown. While Panton was away on Gulf Coast business, Leslie managed the partners' negotiating pitch with Zespedes. Amicable
discussions between the parties preceded the presentation of the
Scotsmen's memorial, or formal petition. Leslie communicated
easily with Captain Carlos Howard, an Irish Catholic in the Spanish
16

For the issue of contraband and the South Sea Company, see Peggy A. Liss,
Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution (Baltimore, MD:Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 9-10, 75-76; Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein,
Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 136-140; Adrian J.
Pearce, British Trade with Spanish America, 1763-1808 (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool
University Press, 2007), 18-25.
17 Jasanoff, Liberty's Exiks, 74-75, 215-218; Narrett, Adventurism and Empire, 116119; Helen Hombebeck Tanner, aspedes in East Florida, 1784-1790 Uacksonville: University of North Florida Press, 1989), 45-48. There were twenty-three
Anglo households, comprising eighty-five free persons, living in St. Augustine
and its vicinity in 1786. See Sherry Johnson, "The Spanish St. Augustine Community, 1784-1795: A Reevaluation," Florida Historical Quarterly 68, no. 1 Uuly
1989): 35-39, 48-49.
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service at St. Augustine, who was intermediary as well as translator.
The resulting proposal had collaborative underpinnings that persisted over years. 18
On July 31, 1784, Leslie presented Zespedes with a memorial
that envisioned a compact between a foreign business enterprise
and the Spanish monarchy. Panton, Leslie and Company requested "the protection" of his Catholic Majesty-Carlos III of Spainso that the partners might receive "his gracious permission" to
continue trade with Indians on the same basis as they had under
the British government. Privately, Leslie anticipated that his firm
might gain Spanish approval to continue its Florida business for a
three-year period. He may have hoped for a more lasting footing
but he did not count on it. 19
The Scottish merchants' petition built on their Loyalist experience in important ways. It touted their "capital and credit," British commercial connections, and their capacity to secure Indian
adherence to Spain in order to fend off U.S. intrusions. The issue
of allegiance was addressed in a subtle manner intended to satisfy Spanish needs while still respecting the partners' ties to their
native country and king. Panton and Leslie declared their willingness to give an "oath of obedience and fidelity to the Crown of
Spain" along with due "submission, loyalty, and constancy" as long
as they were permitted "to live under and enjoy its protection of
our persons and estates." They proposed a "transfer" of loyalty for
an unstated period. Not renouncing their ties to "our sovereign,"
by inference George III, they offered the "same attachment and
faithful adherence" to the Spanish monarch. Panton and Leslie
explicitly requested the right to withdraw from his Catholic Majesty's dominions to British territories on giving formal notice, or
when compelled by a future Anglo-Spanish war, in which case they
pledged to take no personal part against Spain. Knowing that
18

19

Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 63-64;Johnson, "The Spanish St. Augustine
Community," 47. Published translations and transcripts concerning Panton,
Leslie and Company and Spanish officialdom are in D.C. Corbitt, ed. and
trans., "Papers Relating to the Georgia-Florida Frontier, 1784-1800," Georgi,a
Historical Quarterly 20, no. 4 (December 1936): 356-365; 21, no. 1 (1937): 73-83,
185-188, 274-293, 373-381; 22, no. 1 (1938): 72-76, 184-191, 286-291, 391-394;
23, no. 1 (1939): 77-79, 189-202, 381-387; 24, no. 1 (1940): 77-83, 150-157,
257-271, 374-381; 25, no 1 (1941): 67-76, 159-171. (This essay employs original
documents in preference to transcripts whenever possible.)
Because this document appears to be extant only in translation from Spanish,
I have quoted only where most important to convey the memorial's substance.
The translation is in Lockey, East Florida, 258. On Leslie's expectations, see
Leslie to Forbes,July 25, 1784, PLC, reel 1.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol96/iss2/2

10

Narrett: William Panton, British Merchant and Politico: Negotiating Allegi
WILLIAM PANTON
145
Spanish vassalage was inseparable from Catholicism, they tactfully
requested his Majesty's "indulgence .. .in regard to our religious persuasions until perhaps a conviction of the errors of Protestant doctrine shall cause our conversion to the Catholic faith." 20
Because of pressing needs, Zespedes did not demand that
Panton and Leslie either convert to Catholicism or make any declaration of faith whatsoever. He allowed the Scottish partners to
continue their business pending the approval of superior officers
and royal assent. Zespedes's hand was strengthened by the fact
that Panton and Leslie had the backing of Alexander McGillivray,
the dynamic Creek leader of Scots-Indian ancestry whose literacy,
intelligence, and influence greatly appealed to Spanish authorities.
Formerly a staunch British Loyalist, McGillivray deeply resented
the recent peace settlement by which England ceded much of his
people's lands to the United States. Onjune 1, 1784, he headed
a Creek delegation at Pensacola that entered into a treaty of commerce and friendship with Spain, which was represented by three
key figures: Louisiana governor Esteban Miro, Martin Navarro as
Louisiana's intendant or chief financial administrator, and Arturo
O'Neill, governor and commandant of Pensacola. 21
McGillivray's diplomacy had support not only in Upper Creek
country where he resided but also among related groups living
closer to the Gulf Coast. In December 1784, a Lower Creek and
Seminole delegation visited St. Augustine where the headmen
expressed their pleasure that "the Spaniards and Englishmen were
living together like brothers." Moreover, they wished trade goods
to come to them by "salt water" [i.e., the ocean] "as in the time
of the English." They accordingly desired British storehouses to
remain open by the St.Johns River and at Pensacola and San Marcos, with this last post being especially convenient to them. Panton, Leslie and Company had precisely the same geographic orbit
in mind. The firm began its new operations under Spain with vital
Creek and Seminole consent. 22
20
21

22

Lockey, East Florida, 258-260.
For McGillivray's perspective, see DuVal, Independence Lost, 246-255; Melissa A.
Stock, "Sovereign or Suzerain: Alexander McGillivray's Argument for Creek
Independence After the Treaty of Paris of 1783," Georgi,a Historical Quarterly 92,
no. 2 (Summer 2008): 149-176; Karl Davis, "The Founding ofTensaw: Kinship,
Community, Trade, and Diplomacy in the Creek Nation," in Coastal Encounters:
The Transformation of the Gulf South in the Eighteenth Century, ed. Richmond F.
Brown (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 81-98.
For the treaty, see Archivo General de Indias [AGI]: Papeles procedentes de la
isla de Cuba (cited hereafter as PC), legajo 2360. All citations of the Papeles
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Spanish treaty arrangements ironically restored a commercial
network that had thrived during the Revolutionary War when the
bulk of the Creek nation supported the British against Galvez's
forces in 1780-1781. As Galvez looked to the post-war era, he
had no intention of allowing Anglo merchants to remain on the
Gulf Coast. While still serving as Louisiana's governor in 1781,
he designated Gilbert Antoine de Saint-Maxent, his father-in-law
and a wealthy New Orleans merchant, to oversee Gulf Coast Indian
commerce. The plan went awry, however, when Saint-Maxent was
prosecuted for smuggling in 1783-1784. Galvez initially accepted
Panton's business as a stop-gap measure but adopted a more liberal
stance once he recognized how strongly McGillivray lobbied for
the Scottish firm. While serving as Viceroy of Mexico in 1785, don
Bernardo recommended that the crown allow Panton to export
deerskins free of duty. One can only imagine how Galvez might
have steered Gulf Coast policy had he not died in Mexico City at·
age forty the next year. His uncle, Minister of the Indies Jose de
Galvez, took a similarly pragmatic line toward Panton, Leslie and
Company before his own death in 1787. 23
Bernardo de Galvez's influence over Spanish governance in
Louisiana and the Floridas persisted well after his death. Seeing
New Orleans as the hub of regional royal authority, he ruled that
Louisiana's governor held jurisdiction over all of West Florida,
whose boundaries were extended well east of Pensacola in 1785
to take in San Marcos de Apalache-the Spanish garrison closest
to the Seminoles. Panton's relations with Louisiana's governor
became all important to his company's legal, political, and commercial standing along the Gulf. His Wakulla River storehouse was
just a few miles from San Marcos. 24

23

24

are from photostats in the Library of Congress. A Spanish transcript of the
treaty is in Miguel Gomez del Campillo, Relaciones diplomaticas entre Espana y
los Estados Unidos, 2 vols. (Madrid: Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo,
1944-1945), 1: 412-419. The Lower Creek and Seminole delegation's talk to
Zespedes of December 8, 1784 is in Lockey, East Florida, 430.
Bernardo de Galvez to Jose de Galvez, October 27, 1785; AHN, Estado, legajo 3898. The elder Galvez (marques de Sonora) took a more liberal stance
toward Panton and Leslie in 1786-1787 than did Bernardo del Campo, Spanish
ambassador to Great Britain. See Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 87-92.
Thomas D. Watson, "A Scheme Gone Awry: Bernardo de Galvez, Gilberto
Antonio de Maxent, and the Southern Indian Trade," Louisiana History 17, no.
1 (Winter 1976): 5-17. See also, Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 8-14, 69-72.
The above authors use the Spanish rendering of Gilbert Antoine de SaintMaxent. For the deaths of Bernardo andjose de Galvez, see David Weber, The
Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
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More than two years passed from the time that Panton and
Leslie began operations under Spanish authority and when the
partners actually swore the oat~s they ple~ged to make in their initial petition of July 1784. Leshe finally did so on August 28, 1786;
Panton followed later on February 14, 1787 and gave a revised version of his oath on April 28. The delay attested to the snail's pace
of Madrid's imperial bureaucracy and the slowness of transatlantic communication. By royal order of March 8, 1786, the Spanish crown formally approved the firm's memorial to conduct the
Indian trade-on condition that Panton, Leslie, and their associates take an oath of "loyalty and obedience" (fidelidad, y obediencia)
to the monarch. 25
The oaths sworn by the Scots partners varied in character,
which reflected each man's relations with officials in a particular
locale. Leslie made a profession of loyalty to the Spanish king at
the Castillo de San Marcos-the royal fortress in St. Augustine. He
swore his oath while placing his hand on a Bible and "the four gospels" in the presence of Governor Zespedes, Captain Carlos Howard, and witnesses. Leslie took the oath not simply for himself but
also in the name of all in his employ. To insure the oath's validity,
Zespedes had the Scottish merchant make his pledge in view of
Carlos Ill's portrait. The king might not be physically present, but
his image was there as a symbol of authority. 26
Panton swore his loyalty oath in Pensacola's royal plaza before
Colonel Arturo O'Neill, an Irish Catholic in the Spanish service.
Placing his hand on a clearly identified "Protestant Bible," Panton
pledged fidelity to Carlos III and his successors and promised to
comport himself as befitting all vassals. He concurrently reserved
his "inalienable loyalty" (fidelidad inaleinada) to George III, his
"native Sovereign" (Soberano natural). In light of his firm's original
memorial, Panton affirmed his liberty to remove himself and his
property to his Britannic Majesty's dominions in case of an "unexpected war." O'Neill, who was fluent in English, gave what appears

25

26

For the royal order of May 8, 1786, see the marques de Sonora (Jose de
Galvez), to Zespedes, Archivo Hist6rico Nacional, Estado [hereafter AHN/E],
legajo 3898, PLC, reel 2. When citing Spanish archives that are in the Panton,
Leslie and Company Papers, the original source is given as well as its place in
the latter collection. See also Richard K Murdoch, "Governor Cespedes and
the Religious Problem in East Florida, 1786," Florida Historical Quarterly 26, no.
4 (April 1948): 325-344; Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 67-72.
Oath of Loyalty, August 28, 1786, AHN/E, legajo 3901, PLC, reel 2.
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to be a close translation of Panton's intent when recording the
oath in Spanish. 27
While Leslie said as few words as possible when swearing loyalty,
Panton was at pains to reassert privileges accorded himself and his
firm. Just two months after giving his initial oath, he presented
O'Neill with a more elaborate declaration, which was written in
English and in his own hand. In this case, he pledged "fidelity" by
promising to be "true and Faithfull [sic] to His Catholic Majesty" as
long as he enjoyed "royal protection"-adding "that in all cases he
will conduct himself as deserving the indulency's [sic] which have or
may be granted to him." He reserved "the allegiance" owed to "his
native Sovereign" (the British monarch) and again stated his right
of retiring to British possessions "if that should hereafter become
the object of his choice," or if an Anglo-Spanish war rendered that
step necessary. He undertook all by "Calling God to Witness, laying
his right hand on the Holy Bible," and pledging "himself according
to the Customs, formality, and religion of his Nation." 28
The oath's written form demonstrates Panton's meticulous
care to spell out contractual rights and obligations. His conception of royal protection reflected British constitutional ideas of
obedience to a monarch who was bound by law. The reference to
the "religion of his nation" is a mark of Pan ton's confidence. The
very idea of a foreign merchant swearing loyalty on a Protestant
Bible was unthinkable at the time in peninsular Spain. While eighteenth-century Spanish communities commonly extended commercial privileges to foreign merchants in peacetime, such persons
were not admitted as vecinos (citizens) unless they demonstrated
some permanent attachment to the community. Catholicism was a
principal sign in this respect. 29
Two weeks after Panton submitted this statement, O'Neill
wrote his superior, Governor Miro, that he did not believe the
27
28
29

Oath of Loyalty, February 14, 1787, PC 38, PLC, reel 3.
Oath of Loyalty, April 28, 1787, PC 37, PLC, reel 3.
For British ideas of liberty, see H.T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property: Political
Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977). For
Spanish naturalization and citizenship, see Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations:
Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 10, 26-27, 70-75, 83-89, 125-128, 136. For the
role of foreign merchants, see Xabier Lamikiz, Trade and Trust in the EighteenthCentury Atlantic World: Spanish Merchants and Their Overseas Networks (Suffolk,
U .K: The Boydell Press, 2010), 33-40; Richard Heer, The Eighteenth-Century
Revolution in Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 78-79, 149,
256-257, 360-361.
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merchant's written oath was a legitimate proof of loyalty. Though
O'Neill did not elaborate on the legal issues at hand, there is no
doubt that he had come to distrust Panton, who lived close by his
military headquarters. Born in Ireland in 1736, O'Neill was an
exile from his native land ruled by British Protestants. In 1781
he gained the satisfaction of serving in Spain's Hibernia regiment
that helped to wrest Pensacola from the English. Though initially
appreciative of Pan ton's mercantile expertise, O'Neill grew suspicious of the Scottish merchant once the latter clamored for broader trading privileges and stated his resolve to quit Florida unless
royal authorities met his demands. The commandant also soured
on McGillivray, who struck him as being Panton's tool and a covert
British Loyalist who would betray Madrid in an Anglo-Spanish war.
In June 1788, O'Neill complained to Miro that Panton and all his
employees, apart from one assistant, had never taken valid loyalty
oaths as royal vassals. 30
O'Neill's critique of Panton was primarily nationalistic rather
than religious. In letters to Miro, the commandant accused both
Panton and McGillivray of having "a love" and "passion" for Britain.
Moreover, O'Neill saw no sign that Panton and the subordinate
British traders under him would ever feel emotionally attached
(affectos) to the Spanish government. He even alleged that Panton
had shown "repugnance" when called on to take a Spanish loyalty
oath. While the House of Panton might be provisionally tolerated,
in his view it should be replaced as soon as practicable by "persons
who themselves glory in being loyal vassals of the king." O'Neill's
argument mirrored the popular Spanish ideal, also common in the
British world, that "love" was an essential element in the reciprocal
bond between monarch and subject. 31
30

31

O'Neill to Miro, May 16, 1787, PC 37, PLC, reel 3; O'Neill to Miro, June 4,
1788, AHN/E, legajo 3901. See also Eric Beerman, "Arturo O'Neill: First Governor of West Florida during the Second Spanish Period," Florida Historical
Quarterly 60, no. 1 Quly 1981): 29-41.
For the charge of "love" and "passion" for Britain, see respectively O'Neill to
Miro, June 4, 1788, PLC, reel 3; O'Neill to Miro, June 22, 1788, PLC, reel 4.
Panton's alleged "repugnance" is described in O'Neill to Miro.June 18, 1788,
PLC, reel 4. (All these documents are in AHN/E, legajo 3901.) For the bond
of "love" between monarch and subjects, see Charles C. Noel, "In the House
of Reform: The Bourbon Court of Eighteenth-Century Spain," in Enlightened
Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750-1830, ed. Gabriel
Paquette (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 153. For British colonial veneration
of the monarch, see Brendan McConville, The King's Three Faces: The Rise and
Fall of Ruyal America, 1688-1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2006), 171-176.
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Fortunately for the House of Panton, it enjoyed not only
Mir6's support but also the backing of Martin Navarro as provincial intendant and chief fiscal officer. Well versed in political economy, Navarro arrived in Madrid in early 1789 to report
on colonial affairs and to encourage Spanish involvement in the
Indian trade of the Floridas and Mississippi Valley. Although he
had recently resigned his intendancy, his recommendations to
Spain's Supreme Council of State carried great weight because
of expertise gained through more than two decades of service in
New Orleans. A reformer at heart, his prescriptions appealed to
the Bourbon monarchy's belief in rational efficiency and progress as bulwarks of the imperial state. In light of Navarro's advice,
the Supreme Council approved commercial measures designed
to preserve McGillivray's friendship and the Creek alliance with
Spain. By a royal order of March 23, 1789, Panton, Leslie and
Company obtained the right of duty-free trade on both the import
and export of essential articles in the Indian commerce of the
Floridas-including Mobile in tandem with Pensacola. The firm
secured its place at Mobile following the bankruptcy of James
Mather, an English merchant of Louisiana previously allotted that
port's Indian commerce. Mather's failure opened the way for Panton to enter trade with the Choctaws and Chickasaws beyond his
base with the Creeks and Seminoles. Buoyed by this gain, Panton
came to believe that his firm alone could efficiently manage the
deerskin traffic in which a commodity subject to worm-infestation
and spoilage had to be stored and loaded at Florida's ports and
carried across the ocean. The procurement of suitable English
goods for the return western passage was also challenging. The
firm had to satisfy its British creditors while it kept other accounts
current with the middlemen who carried deerskins and supplies
back and forth between Indian villages and port. 32
32

The Supreme Council of State agreed with the recommendation in Navarro's
report on March 16, 1789. The royal order is in Antonio Valdes [Minister of
the Indies] to Miro, March 23, 1789, PLC, reel 5. This order was supplemented by royal order ofJanuary 25, 1790 that accorded duty-free trading rights to
Panton's firm at San Marcos de Apalache and permitted it to conduct trade
on the Mississippi River for the purchase of sugar required to buy salt and
rum in Havana. See Valdes to Miro, January 25, 1790, PLC, reel 5. All these
documents are in AHN/E, legajo 3901. See also Coker and Watson, Indian
Traders, 128-130. For the Spanish Bourbon monarchy's reformist tendencies,
see J.H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 14921830 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 303-304, 307-309, 365. See
also Navarro's report of April 26, 1789 to Valdes for increasing Spanish trade
with Louisiana and the Floridas, in Arthur Preston Whitaker, trans. and ed.,
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When issuing its ruling of March 1789, the Spanish Supreme
Council of State explicitly rejected O'Neill's argument that a drastic reordering of Indian commerce was needed because Panton
and McGillivray were of "English heart" ( Corazon Ingles). The council considered both men's native loyalty "very natural" given their
birth and ancestry. Moreover, the fact that Panton and McGillivray had British roots was seen as heightening their opposition to
the United States and therefore drawing them closer to Spain. In
effect, Spanish self-interest trumped narrow nationalistic or religious considerations. The House of Panton enhanced its commercial privileges during a trying period for the Spanish imperial state.
Carlos III, who had ruled for nearly three decades, had died in
December 1788 and his far less capable son, Charles IV, was now on
the throne. Given the marginal place of the Floridas in the Spanish empire, Maqrid took the path of least resistance by adopting
the recommendations of its highest-ranking officials in Louisiana. 33
Panton's legal rights surpassed the privileges accorded other
Anglo Protestants who obtained Spanish permission to remain in
Britain's former Natchez district, the Lower Mississippi Valley, and
the Mobile region after the Revolutionary War. By a royal order of
April 5, 1786, such persons were allowed civic rights on the condition that they took an oath of allegiance and abstained from public
Protestant worship. Unlike Panton and Leslie, these settlers were
not permitted to reserve allegiance to the British monarch. 34 In
East Florida, Leslie and associates also had a quite favorable status.
Governor Zespedes did not strictly enforce a royal order of March
8, 1786 that required foreign residents to convert to Catholicism. 35
Documents Relating to the Commercial Policy of Spain in the Floridas with Incidental
Reference to Louisiana (Deland: Florida State Historical Society, 1931), 103-115.
33 John Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808 (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1988),
327-328. For the Council of State in the first years of Carlos IV's reign, see
Allan]. Kuethe and Kenneth]. Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century: War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713-1796 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 323-332.
34 See the oath that Captain Pedro (Pierre:Joseph) Favrot administered to Anglo
Protestants of the Tensaw district above Mobile. The oath is in Guillermo
Nanez Falcon, ed., TheFavrotFamilyPapers: A Documentary Chronic/,e ofEarly Louisiana, vol. 2 (New Orleans, LA: Howard-Tilton Memorial Library of Tulane
University, 1988), 55-56. On Spanish concessions to non-Catholic (Protestant)
settlers and to Panton and Leslie, see Sylvia L. Hilton, "Spanish Louisiana in
Atlantic Contexts: Nexus of Imperial Transactions and International Relations," in Louisiana: Crossroads of the Atlantic World, ed. Cecile Vidal (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 78-80, 83-84.
35 Richard K Murdoch, "Governor Cespedes and the Religious Problem in East
Florida, 1786," Florida Historical Quarterly 26, no. 4 (April 1948): 328-330.
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Panton, Leslie and Company bargained with Spanish colonial authorities in a similar manner to U.S. frontier magnates who
angled for commercial rights on the Mississippi River or requested
permission to emigrate to Louisiana. James Wilkinson, the most
significant of these petitioners, gained a personal hearing at New
Orleans in 1787 because Miro and Navarro favored a lawful downriver commerce along with controlled U.S. immigration. Their
design was to stimulate economic growth and to counter a potential invasion by footloose American frontiersmen. Madrid followed
suit by authorizing innovative measures fashioned to win powerful
friends for Spain in the Western United States. By royal order of
December 1, 1788, reputable American emigrants from Kentucky
and the Ohio Valley obtained landholding and commercial privileges in Louisiana on condition of swearing allegiance to the king
and pledging to defend the Spanish realm. Madrid concurrently
permitted Kentucky residents to ship cargoes down the Mississippi
for sale in New Orleans on payment of a 15% duty, which Louisiana's governor could reduce at his discretion for influential men. 36
The reformed Spanish borderlands policy for Louisiana countenanced a circumscribed trade that would bolster security without
siphoning valuable specie from the province. This last goal proved
far easier to articulate than to implement. (The Floridas as well as
Louisiana were largely dependent on Mexican silver subsidies for
administrative and defensive costs.) Although Madrid authorized
downriver Mississippi shipments of flour and foodstuffs, it refused
to concede either the principle of U.S. navigational rights on the
great river or the movement of foreign ships from the Gulf to New
Orleans. Panton, Leslie and Company similarly operated under
legal constraints from the beginning of their business under the
Castilian flag. While the firm had license to ship goods into Florida
ports for the purchase of deerskins, it was not officially allowed
to market other commodities to white settlers. Spanish imperial
officials wanted to keep the commercial door half-open, confining
the company to minimal shipments per year for both exports and
36

The royal order did not itself specify the wording of the immigrants' oaths
but accepted Mir6's and Navarro's recommendation on the matter. See Miro
and Navarro to Valdes, September 25, 1787, and the royal order of December
1, 1788, in Jose Navarro Latorre and Fernando Solano Costa, JConspiraci6n
espaiiola? 1787-1789: Contribucion al studio de las primeras relaciones hist6ricas entre
Espana y los Estados Unidos de Norteamerica (Zaragoza, SP: Instituto Fernando
el Cat6lico, 1949), 212-213; 323-324. Under the royal order, Mississippi navigational and commercial rights were afforded Kentucky and American settlements along rivers emptying into the Ohio.
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imports. This circumstance created a predictable cycle. Whatever
commercial privileges Panton's firm gained at any one time invariably led to his lobbying for additional permissions. Like Wilkinson,
he paid gratuities to Miro as a matter of course. Bribes smoothed
the way, but their payment should not obscure Miro's policies that
the governor believed were in the royal interest. 37
During his New Orleans visit, Wilkinson stirred Miro's interest
by raising the prospect of bringing Kentucky out of the Union. To
prove his good will, the Kentuckian secretly disavowed his U.S. allegiance and penned his own declaration of loyalty to the Spanish
crown. Wilkinson's surreptitious maneuver paved the way for him
to become a paid Spanish agent-and deepened his New Orleans
connections without foreclosing his advancement within the United States. In this respect, his ploys differed in kind from Panton 's
careful articulation of rights and obligations by contractual oath.
Each man found his own way to keep his options open in a highly
fluid political environment. Whereas Wilkinson dallied with the
idea of migrating to Louisiana, Panton insisted on his right to leave
Spanish Florida by his own choice. Neither man became "Spanish"
by any abiding national allegiance. 38
Panton articulated ideas of English common law in his bid
for a favorable regulatory regime. In an important letter to Miro
of July 1789, he requested permission to sell "necessarys" [sic] to
Spanish garrisons and the inhabitants of Pensacola and Mobile. By
seeking the governor's approval, Panton signaled his desire to be
on the right side of the law. He then invoked a principle: "By the
Laws of England Every thing which is not expressly forbid is Lawfull [sic]. Be so good as [to] inform me if it is so here." Panton's
request specifically involved the question of whether his House
could sell goods to colonials and soldiers, and not only Indians.
On a higher level, he asserted a truism of English common law in
37

38

The gratuities were not incidental. In September 1788, McGillivray expressed
his "satisfaction" to Panton that Mir6 and Navarro had "relinquished their
claim of one fourth of the profits of your trade." See McGillivray to Panton,
September 20, 1788, cited in Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 71n. For
Wilkinson and bribery, see Narrett, Adventurism and Empire, 172-173.
For Wilkinson's pledge, which was not a sworn oath, see "Declaration," August
21, 1787, PC, legajo 2373. For American economic penetration of Spanish
Louisiana, see Light Townsend Cummins, "Oliver Pollock and the Creation of
an American Identity in Spanish Louisiana," eds. Gene Allen Smith and Sylvia
L. Hilton, Nexus of Empire: Negotiating Loyalty and Identity in the Revolutionary
Borderlands, 1760s-1820s (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010), 198218. See also in the same volume, Elizabeth Urban Alexander, "Daniel Clark:
Merchant Prince of New Orleans," 241-267.
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order to maximize his commercial reach under Spanish authority. His question to Miro was rhetorical, based on the presumption that the individual possessed residual rights in the absence of
conclusive statutory limitations. By hook or crook, he wanted Miro
to interpret the king's will with wiggle room for him to trade as
freely as possible-and without competitors in Indian commerce
at Florida's ports. The law of the borderlands was supple, bending
toward accommodation when individuals of different nationality
had common goals. 39
Panton's calculus had little patience with Spanish imperial
policy that stipulated strict price controls in Indian commerce.
By royal order in 1789, Panton, Leslie anc~ Company received
exemption from six percent import and export tariffs so that the
firm could sell goods to Indians at the same price, or at an even
lower rate than charged by American traders. Prices were to be in
line with an established tariff or price schedule, "since any other
method would never satisfy the Indians whose interests the king
observes with the most paternal love." 40 In the Spanish empire,
the monarch traditionally assumed the role of protector of Indian
subjects. The king's mandate hardly guaranteed fair treatment,
however, because creole interests often dictated realities on the
ground.
While Panton was pleased with the exemption from customs
duties, he wrote Miro that he could not "abide exactly" by any price
schedule, at least until he had seen one. His sole pledge was to sell
goods "as cheap if not cheaper... than the Americans can." Panton
clearly assumed that market forces would invariably affect the prices that his traders charged for goods in Indian commerce. In fact,
he advised Miro against setting deerskin prices at the high level
that British authorities had conceded to southern Indian peoples
39

40

Panton to Miro, July 32, 1789, PC 202, PLC, reel 5. For the British colonial
transference of common law to North America before the Revolution, see
Eliga H. Gould, "Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of
the British Atlantic, circa 1772," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 60, no. 3
Quly 2003): 497-499. In English common law, as understood in eighteenth·
century jurisprudence, "liberty is residual, in the sense that everything which
is not expressly forbidden the individual is permitted." See T.R.S. Allan, "Constitutional Rights and Common Law," Oxford journal of Legal Studies 11, no. 4
(Winter 1991): 457.
Valdes to Miro, March 23, 1789, AHN/E, legajo 3901, PLC, reel 5. The Bour·
bon monarchy distinguished between Indian subjects and other Native peoples that were considered barbaric and should be made into Christians and
vassals. See David J. Weber, Barbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age 0/
Enlightenment (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 36-37, 104-107.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol96/iss2/2

20

Narrett: William Panton, British Merchant and Politico: Negotiating Allegi
WILLIAM PANTON

155

at Augusta, Georgia, in 1763. In Panton's view, any such tariff
would render his business untenable since deerskins then fetched
twice the price in Europe as they could at present. Miro did not
press Panton on the tariff question in 1789 because the firm's trade
appeared more vital than ever to binding Indian peoples to Florida's ports and warding off U.S. influence. The royal treasury's
needs also came into play. Both Miro and Navarro appreciated
the fact that the House of Panton supplied Indians with necessities
and thereby reduced "excessive yearly gifts" that the crown would
otherwise be compelled to dispense to Native peoples-at least
until the latter supposedly adopted "the labors and industry of civil
life." 41
When fairly new to Louisiana's governorship in 1784, Miro
had advocated strict adherence to a royal paternalistic ethos. For
instance, he carefully prescribed the manner in which McGillivray
should conduct himself as newly appointed commissary to the
Creeks. McGillivray was to keep all the villages of his nation in
"dependency" and "subordination" to "our Sovereign." He had
the duty of overseeing colonial traders so that the latter adhered
to the "Tariff' of prices specified in the recent Treaty of Pensacola.
Moreover, no trader was to offer credit to any Indian man of more
than 30 pounds in dressed deerskins or their value in raw skins
(those "in the hair" in English parlance). Individual debt above
that amount was deemed "unrecoverable. "42
With McGillivray's and Miro's acquiescence, Panton's traders
bypassed the limit on extending credit. Had Panton been compelled to maintain strict price controls and credit limits, one doubts
that he would have found Indian commerce sufficiently profitable to stay in business. Without ignoring the deleterious aspects
of his firm's oligopoly, we should consider general conditions
41

42

Panton to Miro, July 31, 1789, PC, legajo 202, PLC, reel 5. For Miro's and
Navarro's wariness of "excessive" gifts and their view of Indian life, see their
letter to the marques de Sonora March 24, 1787, AHN/E, legajo 3901, PLC,
reel 3.
Instrucciones a que debera conforrnarse don Alejandro McGillibray Comisario
por la Nacion Espanola el la Nacion Talapuche [i.e., Creek] July 20, 1784, PC,
legajo, 2360. A transcript is in Gomez del Campillo, Realciones diplomaticas, 1:
436-439. The Alibamons, Chickasaws, and Choctaws agreed to a detailed tariff
or price schedule on June 23, 1784. The Creeks also did so at Pensacola. For
the tariff, see Gomez del Campillo, Relaciones diplomaticas, 1: 431-436. Miro
negotiated treaties in June and July 1784 with all the Native peoples listed
above. For an overview, see Jack D.L Holmes, "Spanish Treaties with West Florida Indians, 1784-1802," Rorida Historical Quarterly 48, no. 2 (October 1969):
140-154 (especially pp. 142-144).
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contributing to Native economic hardship. By the 1790s, the
Creeks struggled with depleted deer stocks because of overhunting
and the movement of white settlers onto Native lands. Panton's
factors, or retailers, were an array of white men, those of mixed
ethnic ancestry, Indian headmen, and some blacks, too. The more
ambitious and large-scale traders profited through the credit system even while ordinary Indians became collectively ensnared by
debt far beyond what they could imagine. With no colonial courts
system insuring the collection of debts in interior Indian lands, the
entire system rested on entangled motives of trust, need, gain, and
greed. 43
In theory, Indian discontent with high prices and rising debt
created potential openings for competitors to Panton, Leslie
and Company. In reality, the trading firm enjoyed a substantial
advantage as long as Madrid declined to license other foreign merchants or to entice the crown's subjects to enter the business in
Florida's ports. Perhaps not surprisingly, the primary challenger
to the House of Panton emerged outside prevailing legal boundaries. William Augustus Bowles, Tory exile in the Bahamas, had no
truck with formalities while attempting to overthrow the House of
Panton by bravado, bluff, and daredevil incursions aimed at his
foes' storehouses. Panton's merchant competitors in the Bahamas
funded Bowles, who enjoyed the unofficial backing of the islands'
governor, the Earl of Dunmore. Embarking from Nassau on New
Providence Island, Bowles and his companions were few in number, and consequently intended that Indians would join their cause
en masse. This plan was far from preposterous. Bowles had a charismatic appeal to many Lower Creeks and Seminoles among whom
he had first lived as a teenage Loyalist soldier during the American Revolutionary War. Bidding to overturn the existing order,
he denounced Panton and Leslie for the exorbitant price of their
goods, declared the Creeks a free nation, and excoriated McGillivray for entering a treaty with the United States in 1790. He even
threatened war against Spain unless Madrid accepted his demands
for free trade. 44
43

44

Robbie Ethridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and Their World (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 137-138; Saunt, A New Order of
Things, 223-228; Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, 174-178: Andrew K Frank, Creeks
and Southerners: Biculturalism on the Early American Frontier (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 2005), 33-41.
For interpretive works on Bowles, see J. Leitch Wright, Jr., William Augustus
Bowles: Director General of the Creek Nation (Athens: University of Georgia Press,
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Appointing himself "Director" and "General" of the Creeks
in 1791, Bowles spurred about seventy Creek and Seminole warriors to raid and plunder Panton's Wakulla River storehouse near
Apalachee Bay on January 16, 1792. 45 This victory proved shortlived, however, owing to the opposition that the intruder's band
stirred among Spanish officials who regarded Bowles as an unprincipled "adventurer" determined to oust Spain from the region.
Louisiana governor Francisco Luis Hector, Baron de Carondelet
stayed the danger by luring Bowles to New Orleans and then putting him under arrest. The adventurer was sent on to Cuba and
then to prison in Spain, and eventually to the Philippines before
eventually escaping Spanish clutches at sea and making his way
once more to England and the Bahamas for his last Florida foray
from 1799 to 1803. 46
Bowles' story defies simple summation but it certainly underscores the precariousness of imperial authority in interior regions
of the Gulf Coast. Able to summon only limited force at Apalachee
Bay, Carondelet snared Bowles by subterfuge rather than by force.
Well before this point, McGillivray plotted with Panton in October
1791 to have Bowles assassinated, though the Creek leader's three
chosen warriors failed at the job. This was not the last such attempt
since McGillivray offered a "reward of one hundred Dollars ... all
over the [Creek] Nation" for Bowles or his head. 47

45

46

47

1967). A far more critical view of Bowles is in Gilbert C. Din, War on the Gulf
Coast: The Spanish Fight Aainst William Augustus Bowl,es (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012). See also Narrett, Adventurism and Empire, 211-223
(especially pages 218-223 for the landings of 1788 and 1791-1792).
Bowles's claim as both "Director" and General of the Talapuche, or Creek,
Nation is in his letter to Carondelet, December 4, 1792, PC 2373, PLC reel
6. For the robbery, see Fernando Eduardo de la Puente to Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada,January 25, 1792, East Florida Papers (cited hereafter as EF
Papers), P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, microfilm, reel 47 (microfilm
at Mary Couts Burnett Library, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, Texas);
Lawrence Kinnaird, "The Significance of William Augustus Bowles' Seizure of
Panton's Apalachee Store in 1792," Florida Historical Quarterly 9, no. 3 Uanuary
1931): 156-192.
Din, War on the Gulf Coast, 46-54; 60-76, 214-228; Wright, WilliamAugustusBowl,es,
71-86, 90-98, 124-141, 160-171; Narrett, Adventurism and Empire, 254-262. For a
recent interpretation, see Eliga Gould, "Independence and Interdependence:
The American Revolution and the Problem of Postcolonial Nationhood, circa
1802," William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 74, no. 4 (October 2017): 738-740,
750-751.
For the assassination attempt and the reward, see McGillivray to Panton, October 28, 1791, PC 2362, PLC, reel 6; McGillivray to O'Neill, October 28, 1791,
PC 39, PLC, reel 6.
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William Augustus Bowles (1763-1805) , photograph of original portrait by Thomas
Hardy, 1790-1 791. Courtesy of the State Archives of Florida.

Writing to Carondeletjust after Bowles's capture, Panton justified the assassination scheme to be his lawful duty as a Spanish subject. As he put matters, "I know not any right than an individual of
any nation has of entering the territorys [sic] of another sovereign,
to incite his subjects to revolt, and to commit Robberys [sic] and
other depredations." By this scenario, a private merchant could
choose when to wield force in the Spanish king's name without
first having the royal governor's direct permission to do so. While
Panton opted for eliminating Bowles before Carondelet had taken
charge at New Orleans, the governor came to view matters similarly. On January 19, 1792, Carondelet wrote McGillivray that Bowles
should be taken dead or alive. Bowles was meanwhile said to have
remarked-according to Panton's report-that the storehouse
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robbery was justified in light of the price that the merchant had
put on his head. The issue of rightful authority was as tangled as
the rivals' intrigues. 48
While Panton boosted the military capacity of Native peoples
to resist the U.S. through the years 1784-1794, he had no tolerance
for Indians who complained about prices or those who believed
Bowles to be their friend and champion. Incensed by Lower Creek
support for Bowles, Panton complained to McGillivray for failing to prevent "your people" from joining "with a Scoundrel to
destroy me." This tirade glossed over the fact that McGillivray's
authority was not so great as imagined, and that his influence was
far less among the Lower than Upper Creeks. Panton's letter is
most revealing for expressing his sense of having "relinquished the
ease and pleasures of refined Society" in the business of clothing
Indians "who must otherwise have gone naked" and feeding others
"when they were Starving." He could not conceive that his exertions "of seventeen years past" would be unrequited. Significantly,
Panton dated the beginning of his Creek connections to 1775-the
onset of the Revolutionary War when he risked life and limb to
conduct Indian trade from the Georgia coast. 49
Panton's conception of what Indians owed him came to transcend profit. Once Bowles was arrested, he directly chided Lower
Creek headmen for having trusted an impecunious adventurer"the Prince of Liars" -rather than counting on himself whose
"Vessels came .. .loaded with Goods." 50 Despite his demand for obedience, many Lower Creeks and Seminoles strived to open their
shoreline to a British trade beyond the confines of a single mercantile establishment. They could not afford to give unconditional
trust to Panton any more than they could count on Spain to protect
their lands from U.S. territorial ambitions. In the months after
Bowles's capture, several Creek headmen made the case for a new
port of entry by the Ochlockonee River that would be open to merchant vessels arriving from England or the Bahamas. Encouraged
by George Wellbank, a confederate of Bowles, the chiefs lobbied
48

Panton to Carondelet, March 17, 1792, PLC, reel 6.; Carondelet to McGillivray,
January 19, 1792, EF Papers, reel 43.
49 Panton to McGillivray, February 9, 1792, PC, legajo 203, PLC, reel 6.
50 Panton to the Kings, Warriors, and Headmen of the Cussitas, Cowetas, Broken
Arrow [and] my friend John Kinnaird & all the rest of the Lower Towns, February 19, 1792, PC, 203, PLC, reel 6. A transcript is inJohn Walton Caughey,
McGillivray of the Creeks (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1938),
308-309.
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for their own "House of Commerce" ( Casa de Comercio)-as one
Spanish official reported. In the aftermath of Bowles's capture,
Native leaders refused to surrender Wellbank to Spanish authorities as they were ordered to do. Indians did not control the seas
but they had a deep interest in the admission of merchant vessels
into the coastal areas they held as their own. 51
Indian groups conceived of a just trading order founded on
reciprocity between their people and trustworthy colonials, whether the latter were independent traders or monarchical representatives. In October 1792, Ochillissa Chopka, a principal headman
of the Lower Creek town of Coweta, urged East Florida governor
Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada not to oppose the landing of any
boats bearing trade goods or gifts sent by "their old friends the
English"-whom he also called "our Fathers. "52 A few months later,
Philatouche, a Coweta chief who had fought alongside the British during the Revolutionary War, embarked with about ten other
Creek men for Nassau in the Bahamas. Governor Dunmore met
with all and honored Philatouche with a royal commission as "head
warrior" of his town. The visit sparked a small crisis between Spanish authorities and the Lower Creeks upon Philatouche's return to
the Florida Gulf Coast. 53
Robert Leslie, a Panton employee and John Leslie's brother,
mediated the dispute by defending his firm's business practices to
a group of thirty headmen and warriors. The Chiaha warrior of
Coweta expressed the widespread complaint that the company's
51

52

53

Francisco Montreuil to Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada,January 19, 1793, EF
Papers, reel 43. Wellbank subsequently journeyed to Cherokee country and
then to Canada in order to build ties between southern and northern Indians. He was killed in 1794 by unknown Indian assailants while he headed
southward among the Upper Creeks. For Bowles's Cherokee ties, see William
C. Sturtevant, "The Cherokee Frontiers, the French Revolution, and William
Augustus Bowles," in The Cherokee Nation: A Troubled History, ed. Duane H. King
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1979), 66-71. See also Wright, William Augustus Bowles, 83-84.
Ochillissa Chopka to Quesada, October 23, 1792 (letter transcribed into Spanish by Arturo O'Neill at Coweta), EF Papers, reel 43. Quesada regarded the
chief's talk as "insolent." See Quesada to Montreuil, February 9, 1793, EF
Papers, ibid.
For Philatouche's appointment, see the commission signed by Dunmore, February 5, 1793, EF Papers, ibid. Philatouche's role in the Revolution is discussed
in Martha Condray Searcy, The Georg;i,a-Florida Contest in the American Revolution,
1776-1778 (University: University of Alabama Press, 1985), 86, 179. For Dunmore's role in Bowles's undertakings, see James Corbett David, Dunmore's New
World: The Extraordinary Life of a Royal Governor in Revolutionary America (Charlottesville: University ofVirginia Press, 2013), 160-170.
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oods were too costly and in insufficient supply. Leslie replied by
~iting a fickle Atlantic marketplace: "[I] twas true there was [sic]
bad years & bad crops over the great water at times, as well as it
was with us now; that when things were dear there, they must be so
here .... but when we got the goods easy, so also did they." He also
advised the Lower Creeks not to have "high words" with "their best
friends the Spaniards"-especially "when they knew the Americans
were at this Instant coming against them. "54
Southern Indian fear of the United States worked to the company's advantage, though it did not erase Indian discontent. Hungry Lower Creeks and Seminoles took 30 to 40 head of cattle and
300 chickens from Robert Leslie's estate near Panton's Apalachee
store during the winter of 1792-1793. Other episodes of banditry
put Creek headmen and their towns at odds with one another about
what captured goods should be returned to whites as opposed to
what should be kept. Creek and Seminole raiders often seized
enslaved blacks. Other slaves fled of their own will to Native villages. Panton maintained that he was not legally responsible to a
Louisiana colonist who purchased slaves from him after the blacks
short-circuited the transaction by absconding in Indian country.
In short, white settlers should not expect colonial law to hold fast
beyond the reach of Spanish authorities. 55
Legal ambiguities and disorders abounded in the southern
borderlands in which Panton and Leslie and their factors did business. On an international plane, the U.S. and Spain disputed territorial claims stemming from their discordant peace treaties with
Great Britain. While Madrid believed itself the rightful sovereign to
lands as far north as the Tennessee River, the United States asserted
its treaty rights to all former British imperial claims between the
Mississippi and Chattahoochee Rivers as far south as the 31 st parallel. Panton's political collaboration with Spain reached its highest
point in 1793 to 1794 when Carondelet aggressively pushed for a
southern Indian confederation under royal protection in opposition to the United States. This policy involved the covert arming of
54

Robert Leslie to John Leslie, March 17, 1793, EF Papers, reel 43. See also Din,
War on the Gulf Coast, 63-66. For American trading inroads, see White, R.oots
of Dependency, 89-91; Braund, Deerskins and Duffels, l 76-178; Wright, Creeks and
Seminoles, 50-67.
55 Robert Leslie to John Leslie, March 17, 1793, EF Papers, reel 43. For Indian
banditry and Panton's sale of slaves, see Saunt, A New Order of Things, 105-110,
122-124. See also Cristina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face
of Captivity in Early America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010),
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Native allies as far north as the Cherokee country-an area that was
at the margins of Spanish influence before this time. 56
In the spring of 1792, Pan ton himself undertook a longj ourney
to the Cherokee country, ostensibly for the collection of debts but
sub rosa to push the advantages of a Spanish alliance. John Watts
(Kunoskeskie) of the Chickamaugas was sufficiently encouraged to
come southward for talks with O'Neill at Pensacola. While Watts
returned northward with a large stash of weaponry and gunpowder, other Cherokee chiefs, including the influential Bloody Fellow (Nentooyah), traveled to New Orleans that fall for discussions
with Carondelet. Spanish arms bolstered Cherokee resistance for
a time, but gave way as Madrid retreated from Carondelet's grand
strategy. Spain's war with revolutionary France (1793-1795) dictated caution in distant North America lest the United States be
provoked to war. Life and death were meanwhile on the line for
the Cherokees who depended on the thin reed of Spanish commitments to Indian security. 57
In comparison to Panton's bold maneuvers, John Leslie kept
a circumspect political profile at St. Augustine where he stayed
abreast oflndian affairs, the tempestuous Georgia-Florida frontier,
the Bahamas, and European events. Unlike Panton, Leslie became
fluent in Spanish and was deeply rooted in St. Augustine where he
had a black woman as consort and children by her. While a slaveholder, he served for a time as captain of a unit of free black militia.
Tied to Cuba by trade and governance, East Florida had characteristics of a Spanish colonial society with space for free blacks and
mulattos. 58
A steadfast Spanish ally, Leslie was put on edge once Spain
opened East Florida to American Protestant immigration in 1790.
In a variant on Louisiana's colonial regime, the settlers received
royal land grants on condition of swearing allegiance to the Spanish monarch and abstaining from non-Catholic public worship.
Many new colonists grew disgruntled, however, once discovering
56

57

58

For boundary issues, see Samuel Flagg Bemis, Pinckney s Treaty: Americas Advantage from Europes Distress, 1783-1800, rev. ed., (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1960), 63-66, 103-107, 178-81. For Carondelet's courting of the Creeks,
see Caughey, McGillivray of the Creeks, 52-53 ..
John McDonald to Panton, October 6, 1792 (quotation); McDonald to Panton, September 13, 1793, ANC, Floridas, legajo 1. See also Cumfer, Separate
Peopks, 63-67.
Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana: University of illinois
Press, 1999), 88,118,150,207, 242;Johnson, "The Spanish St. Augustine Community," 42-47, 53-54.
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that they had limited trading rights and were dependent on buying supplies from Leslie's storehouses. With no relief measures
coming from Madrid, a group of settlers plotted rebellion through
collaboration with Georgia frontiersmen and French republican
agents. East Florida's internal friction and external pressures
reached a boiling point in early 1794. Fearing an impending freebooting invasion and settler insurgency, Spanish authorities in St.
Augustine arrested suspected Anglo-American rebels and ordered
settlers in the endangered frontier zone to relocate south of the
St. Johns. East Florida's tortuous situation persisted for years
thereafter. 59
Leslie was in a delicate position during the troubles because of
his personal friendship with several accused rebel ringleaders. On
January 23, 1794, he served as interpreter at Governor Quesada's
interrogation of accused insurgent John McIntosh. The key legal
issue at hand was whether McIntosh had withheld information
from Spanish authorities about his contacts with Georgia conspirators and their East Florida confederates. Leslie cautiously admitted
that Macintosh had previously shared some knowledge with him
about the threat, but then excused the suspect's oversight of not
divulging information to royal officers as an unintentional mistake. The merchant's word was unavailing. McIntosh was found
guilty of abetting conspiracy and sent to prison in Havana. Though
released on Madrid's orders after several months, he never forgave
Quesada's judgment and joined in a Georgia guerilla attack on
East Florida in 1795. 60
Leslie took a more discreet political tack than Panton partly
because of his sensitivity to East Florida's vulnerable situation relative to Georgia. Panton's perspective was more thoroughly continental in scope than his partner's view from St. Augustine. His
stake in business was also larger. In a last will and testament ofJune
1793-drafted eight years before his death-Panton estimated his
wealth at £30,000, consisting mainly of mercantile assets and trade
59

60

Charles E. Bennett, Floridas ''French" Revolution (Gainesville: University Presses
of Florida, 1981); Janice Borton Miller, "The Struggle for Free Trade in East
Florida and the Cedula of 1793," Florida Historical Quarterly 55, no. 1 Uuly
1976): 48-59; Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2002), 243-252; Richard K. Murdoch, The Georgia-Florida Frontier, 17931796: Spanish R.eaction to French Intrig;ue and American Designs (Berkeley: U niversity of California Press, 1951).
Statement of John McIntosh, January 23, 1794, in Bennett, Florida's ''French"
Revolution, 79. See also Janice Borton Miller, "The Rebellion in East Florida in
1795," Florida Historical Quarterly 57, no. 2 (October 1978): 173-186.
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goods besides houses and slaves. Five years later, Leslie expressed
the hope that his estate, once creditors were paid, would clear
£2000 at his death. Neither man included Indian debts owed them
in these calculations, probably because of the uncertainty of how
those immense sums could be collected. Panton's will pointedly
ordered his executors not to pay any debts contracted to the citizens of Georgia before 1783 since that state had banished him as
a traitor and confiscated his property during the Revolution. He
still recognized the legitimacy of debts to U.S. nationals that he
had incurred since the war's end. 61 This stance left open a possible detente between the House of Panton and the United States.
Good business was good politics in the merchant's ledger.
Panton's sensibility may be gleaned from a remarkable letter of
April 10, 1794, which he wrote Lachlan McGillivray, father of Alexander McGillivray, more than one year after the latter had died in
Pensacola. The elder McGillivray, now living in Scotland, was himself an Indian trader of many years whose lands and properties had
been confiscated by Georgia Whigs during the Revolution. After
conveying his respects, Panton recalled the younger McGillivray's
plight at the war's end: "I found him deserted by the British, without pay, without money, without friends, without property, saving a
very few negroes, & he and his nation threatened with destruction
by the Georgians, unless they agreed to cede to them the better
part of their country." 62
Panton further observed how the deceased man might be
monetarily indebted to him, but that the balance actually stood
in McGillivray's favor in consideration of the latter's assistance in
procuring "more solid" privileges for the trading house than would
have been otherwise possible. Panton did not disguise his own role
in McGillivray's rise: "I advised, I supported, & pushed him on to
be the great man. Spaniards and Americans felt his weight, and
this enabled him to haul me after him." Panton acknowledged
that McGillivray had received a share of his company's profits from
1785 to 1787, but did not explain the political differences that had
led him to halt the Creek leader's retainer. In fact, the merchant
61

62

Last Will and Testament of John Leslie, August 6, 1798; Last Will and Testament of William Panton,June 6, 1793, codicil ofJanuary 27, 1801, PLC, reel 8.
Panton died on February 26, 1801 and Leslie in December 1803. See Coker
and Watson, Indian Traders, 47n, 235.
Panton to Lachlan McGillivray, April 10, 1794, PLC, reel 8. See also Edward].
Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader: The Shaping of the Southern Colonial
Frontier (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992), 287-289, 298-300, 307-308.
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stopped payment when McGillivray briefly toyed with the idea that
Bowles might become a supplier of Creek arms and goods. 63
Panton bemoaned the fact that Alexander McGillivray had
made an informal last will and testament rather than a legal document "which is requisite in an English Court of Justice." The
deceased man's sisters instead took hold of much of the estate with
respect to Creek customs of matrilineal descent. Panton explained
that he would do what he could for McGillivray's children, but he
expected grandfather Lachlan to do his share. The master of Gulf
Coast commerce had limited influence over the Indian territories
in which his traders did business. He had greater success within the
Spanish realm. Through Mir6's good offices, Panton won Madrid's
assurance in 1790 that his estate would not be subject to forfeiture
after his death by any ruling that he was a resident alien. Property
rights had to be secured in this life and beyond the grave. 64
Panton's political realism allowed for adaptations and adjustments. While the impetuous upstart Bowles was an irredeemable
enemy, more sober actors could be mollified on the basis of mutual self-interest. Although Arturo O'Neill bitterly opposed Panton's privileges during the late 1780s, the two men drew together
through opposition to Bowles as well as to the United States. In
his last will, Panton bequeathed $4000 to O'Neill above other sums
that he held on the commandant's behalf. Their partnership evidently built on collaboration to supply the Cherokees, and perhaps
other Native groups with arms, munitions, and trade goods. 65
While constantly wary of American business competitors, Pan ton
was even more jealous of his Spanish commercial privileges, which
he labored so hard to achieve and to expand. In late 1792, he complained sharply when Carondelet permitted John Turnbull, a former
British Loyalist of Natchez, to establish trade through Mobile to the
Chickasaws. Indian interests figured significantly in this decision.
Many Chickasaws favored Turnbull because the latter had lived and
married among them for some years. Panton responded by claiming a violation of the "exclusive Trade" to which he believed himself
63
64
65

Ibid.
Last Will and Testament ofWilliam Panton,June 6, 1793, codicil ofJanuary 27,
1801, PLC, reel 8. For the descent of property, see See Saunt, A New Order of
Things, 88-89; Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 129.
Last Will and Testament of William Panton, June 6, 1793, codicil of January
27, 1801, PLC, reel 8. O'Neill was transferred from his post at Pensacola to
Campeche in 1793. For his collaboration with Panton, see Coker and Watson,
Indian Traders, 161-162, 211.
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entitled by royal order. His argument was that the Spanish king had
granted him "rights" and "Priviledges" [sic] that "cannot legally be
altered, suspended or revocked [sic], by any power on Earth, short
of the same authority that formed them"-i.e., by the king. 66
Historians have been so accustomed to thinking of Panton,
Leslie and Company as a monopoly that they may overlook the fact
that Spanish royal edicts granted the firm highly favorable but not
strictly exclusive trading privileges. By Castilian law, the monarch
had the prerogative to bestow concessions as he pleased; the sovereign could similarly rescind a grantee's rights if he judged the
recipient deficient or in violation of the royal will. Panton was of
another view. By 1793, he justified his privileges as a monopoly that
he had earned by his business skill and not simply an act of royal
munificence. In fact, he maintained that monopoly was the only
possible way that his company could profitably conduct trade. All
his arguments and pleas came back to the great strain of managing
the Gulf Coast Indian trade and the necessity of advantages over
rivals based in the United States. 67
Carondelet did not yield to Panton on the license to Turnbull
though he generally assisted the firm throughout his governorship.
Panton pushed his demands ever forward. In 1793, he proposed
to pull out and sell his firm's entire assets, including Indian debts
owed the company, to any New Orleans merchant group that won
government license for the Gulf Coast-Mississippi Indian commerce. No rival entity emerged to bargain on these terms. A year
later, Panton devised a complex plan by which the Spanish crown
could either buy out his firm, award it additional privileges, or
make a loan of $400,000 to the company so that it could relocate to
England and conduct the Florida Indian trade through its London
headquarters. After three years without any imperial response,
Panton renewed the issue at a potentially higher price tag-and
with Carondelet's backing-but was put off again. 68 The governor
66

Panton to Carondelet, January 1, 1793, ANC, Floridas, legajo 1, PLC, reel 7;
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was not initially an enthusiastic supporter of the House of Panton
but rather adapted to the firm's predominance. Besides appreciating Panton's support of the southern Indian confederation, Carondelet realized that the firm's position was a necessity unless Madrid
opened New Orleans to foreign shipping in a manner that would
stimulate a truly competitive Indian trade in Florida's Gulf ports
and the Lower Mississippi Valley. 69
Panton recalibrated his monetary calculus after the Treaty of
October 27, 1795 by which Spain not only recognized U.S. navigational rights on the Mississippi for the river's entire length, but also
conceded all territorial claims above the 31 st parallel in a broad
region between the Mississippi and Chattahoochee Rivers. The
treaty's fifth article stated a commitment "to make the advantages
of the Indian trade common and mutually beneficial" to the subjects and citizens of both Spain and the United States. 70 As a result
of the new boundary agreement, Madrid no longer held any sovereign claim to territories where most Choctaws and Creeks lived, let
alone to the more northerly Chickasaws and Cherokees. Carondelet's vision of Spain as imperial guardian of a southern pan-Indian
confederacy was dead. In reality, Spanish commitments to the
Creeks had an escape clause not so dissimilar to that which Panton,
Leslie and Company had from Spain. The Treaty of Pensacola of
1784 granted royal protection to the Creeks within Spanish sovereign territory. If the crown was compelled to yield that ground by
war or any other cause, the monarch was obligated to find other
lands for the Creeks elsewhere in his dominions. That pledge
passed into abeyance. 71
OnJuly 25, 1796, Panton informed Carondelet that Spain had
officially abandoned his House by the terms of the recent U.S.
treaty, and that the crown was therefore accountable to his firm
for "upwards of Two hundred thousand Dollars due us in the four
69
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For Carondelet's initial plan for New Orleans commerce, see his letter to
Floridablanca, February 25, 1792, PC, legajo 177. The governor affirmed the
House of Panton's importance even while criticizing it for charging Indians an
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Nations"-the Creeks, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws. As
he put matters: "Ifwe are not compensated by Government," then
"we ... must either submit to absolute ruin or bow our knees to
those we have much offended & endeavor to soften their resentment in the best manner we Can." This statement implied a resort
to the former American enemy if Spanish assistance were unavailing. The table was now being set for the huge paybacks that Forbes
would eventually realize through U.S. Indian treaty-making after
Panton's death. Only a viable state power, not a private firm alone,
could compel the payment oflndian debt. 72
Panton's last years were marked by overlapping business and
political crises-difficulties magnified by Spain's disastrous turn
from war with France to alliance with the French republic in hostilities against England (1796-1802). The turbulent international climate of the late 1790s put Panton's government attachments to the
test. With the support of Louisiana's governors and broadly construed royal exemptions, he and Leslie were permitted to conduct
Florida's Indian trade through the use of neutral vessels and with
supplies commonly procured in the United States. At Carondelet's
insistence, Panton and his employees took an oath in March 1797
by which they swore neither to impede the Spanish war effort nor
to aid Spain's enemies in any manner. The oath documented legal
obligations short of any change in national identity or allegiance.
Writing to Carondelet, Panton described his pledge as an "oath of
neutrality," which was at the same time given "by all my family" in
Pensacola. The owner's word carried a patriarchal stamp; the subordinates who pledged alongside him were not individually named
in the Spanish record. 73
Panton's dealings over the years reveal discrepancies between
Madrid's imperial perspective and the realities of frontier commercial and political exchange. This was especially apparent during
the early stages of the Anglo-Spanish warfare. In April 1797, Manuel de Godoy, who was both duque de Alcudia and the king's first
minister, wondered whether the House of Panton, which enjoyed
"the exclusive privilege of the peltry trade with interior Indians
[salvajes] ," would use its influence among Native peoples to deliver
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the Floridas to the British. Well before this message reached Louisiana, Carondelet confidently negotiated the purchase of one
thousand British rifles from Panton. Six hundred of the guns
were to be fully paid for while the remainder was bought on credit,
pending the arrival of the situado--the silver subsidy shipped from
the Spanish government coffers in Mexico. By this transaction,
the governor acquired weaponry that the crown would dispense
as gifts in order to secure Native loyalty. Juan Ventura Morales,
Louisiana's intendant, went along with the governor's judgment on
the gun purchase, though he believed the price somewhat high. A
punctilious administrator, Morales was disgusted by Panton's penchant for broadening privileges; he denied the merchant's plea for
the duty-free export of certain goods besides deerskins. The intendant bristled that Panton aspired to make himself the "absolute
master" of commerce without being held to "any rule or subordination [sujeci6n] ." 74
Morales's strict interpretation of regulations irked Panton, but
it did not prevent the latter's trade from growing simultaneously
with the United States and Campeche, where dyewoods were purchased for shipment to England. Panton also earned profits by
carrying mail for Spanish officials and supplying royal garrisons
with foodstuffs. His ships stowed necessary registry papers-British, Spanish, and U .S.-and flew whichever national banner was
needed at particular ports of call. U.S. merchants themselves dramatically increased their trade with Louisiana while Spanish colonies were cut off from the mother country by British naval might. 75
Being a British national did not automatically mean that Panton's business would be protected in the English realm during war
with Spain. An English privateer seized one of his ships in early 1798
and a Nassau vice-admiralty court condemned the vessel as a legitimate prize. In the main, however, British imperial policies were
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sufficiently flexible to allow a wartime trade between Florida ports
and the Bahamas and Jamaica by which deerskins were exchanged
for approved manufactures. The reputation of Panton and Leslie
as dedicated British Loyalists carried some weight in London. In
1800, the firm received the Board of Trade's permission to ship
guns and munitions from British dominions to Florida for use in
the Indian trade. By a complementary arrangement negotiated
that year through New Orleans, the House of Panton purchased
gunpowder and lead balls from the provincial royal storehouse for
its Indian trade. 76
Panton held true to his oath to Spain in the sense of carrying
on commerce that was vital to exerting Madrid's influence among
Indian peoples and even to holding off U.S. commercial and territorial advances for a time. In the course of the 1790s, however,
he became so preoccupied with monopolistic concessions and
government indemnification that his aims diverged from Spanish
objectives and saddled an enormous debt on Indian customers and
suppliers.
The United States, rather than Spain, would ultimately make
good on the losses that his firm sustained at Bowles's hands during
the robbery of his storehouse in 1792 and the destruction of property during the adventurer's subsequent attacks in and about San
Marcos de Apalache in 1800. In this last instance, the Seminole
headman Kinache was Bowles's key ally in attracting a sufficient
Indian force to capture the Spanish fort at San Marcos. Interestingly, Kinache was also a factor for Panton, Leslie and Company.
Purchasing goods from that House over years did not lead him
to a definite and lasting commitment to any colonials. Well after
Bowles died in a Havana prison 1805, Kinache went on to become
a Redstick chief in war against the United States and its Indian
allies in 1813. Native loyalties played out in a multitude of ways
across the Gulf Coast and interior lands where Panton aspired for
grander powers than lay within his grasp. 77
The legal structure that supported Panton, Leslie and Company certainly rested on Spanish permissions for port and shipping
privileges. What was no less vital was the spread of credit-based
trade through white, Indian, and mestizo middlemen whose purchases from Panton were measured in British pounds and Spanish
76

Coker and Watson, Indian Traders, 209-219.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol96/iss2/2
36
77 For Kinache's role, see Saunt, A New Order of Things, 206, 211-212, 225, 243,
247, 286-287; Din, War on the Gu,lfCoast, 109-110, 191, 197, 204-206, 210.

Narrett: William Panton, British Merchant and Politico: Negotiating Allegi
WILLIAM PANTON

171

dollars. These traders, who calculated the value of deerskins by
quality, size, and weight, credited their customers with "chalks"chalk marks on paper, parchment, or in their ledgers. Panton and
Leslie did business with Indian men of varying persuasions-Philatouche and Kinache-sometime allies of Bowles. In May 1797,
White Lieutenant-a well-to-do headman of the Upper Creek
Okfuskees-resolved a business dispute with Panton by pledging
to pay a debt of "Six hundred and Eighty five Spanish Milled Dollars, five & a half rials [ reales]" or its value in "good raw deer Beaver
& other skins at the market price" within six months. No paper
money was to be accepted in payment-a stipulation suggesting
that promissory or bank notes circulated in the region. Although
White Lieutenant could not sign his name, he was conversant with
capitalist procedures connected to the peltry trade. His acumen
enabled him to acquire a livestock herd at Nyuka, the village where
he died in 1799. 78
Panton's strivings were of a different scope than White Lieutenant's, whose attachments were communal rather than mercantile at their core. Along with partner John Leslie, Panton deeply
valued his British allegiance along with the merchant's freedom of
movement across national bounds. Government license and protection mattered, especially for merchants whose commerce transcended national boundaries on land and sea. Though Panton
lived in the era of Adam Smith, he depended on a mercantilist
system in which traders procured special privileges through government license. The world of free trade was far slower to emerge
in reality than in theory.
Panton, Leslie and Company successively redefined contractual relations with Spanish authority over time. In the process,
Panton regarded Madrid's bestowal of privileges to be his firm's
legally secured rights as long as the company fulfilled its stipulated
responsibilities. Oaths of fidelity required faithfulness in the business and political realm but not vassalage. Panton, Leslie and Company did not simply dictate commerce in the Floridas. Dependent
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on intermediaries in the deerskin trade, they also worked through
crown officials on the provincial scene who managed negotiations
according to how they conceived the king's interests within a fragile frontier domain. Louisiana's governors routinely rationalized
departures from strict protocol as essential for restraining the United States and defending Mexico. In the process, they augmented
the region's capitalist economy in Indian commerce at the same
time they promoted greater leeway in the Mississippi trade and in
U.S. settlement of the realm. 79
For all Panton's success, there was an air of deepening frustration and fatigue in his last strivings. His final two proposals in 1799
and 1800 for large concessions failed for want of Spanish approval.
The first involved his effort to gain a hold on the Indian trade west
of the Mississippi Valley. Louisiana authorities declined to concede
this prerogative lest it interfere with the trade of villagers of the Illinois country and other frontier zones. The second initiative aimed
at a monopoly of Louisiana's lucrative slave trade. In effect, Panton
asked for the privilege of asiento--echoing an old British commercial aim. Accustomed to owning slaves and slave trading over the
years, he appears to have been wholly untouched by the growing
English antislavery movement at the eighteenth-century's close. 80
The marques de Casa Calvo, Spain's governor at New Orleans,
was prepared to allow Panton some advantages in the slave trade,
but not "exclusive" rights at the expense of provincial merchants.
Panton, a master entrepreneur in the Indian trade, hungered for
a monopoly to import enslaved Africans to the Mississippi Valley in
order to compensate for debts that his firm had not yet collected
from Native peoples. 81 The deerskin trade-with all its uncertain79
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ties and myriad of actors-neither brought the assured profits he
craved nor the opportunity to settle debts and to return to Britain.
Juan Ventura Morales, always skeptical of Panton, mulled
over Spanish challenges in the wake of the merchant's death. On
December 31, 1801, he took some hope in reports that the war
with England with soon end. But if the conflict continued, Morales
believed that Pensacola would be indefensible because of the House
of Pan ton's "ascendancy over the Indians"; the House's loyalty was
steadfastly English in his view. As the intendant observed, Native
peoples were fully aware that nearly all of the traders that served
the House were British by nationality. Moreover, the middlemen
had done little, in Morales's words, "to wean" Native peoples from
their desire to return matters to conditions as they were before the
peace of 1783-when the British had taken on "immense costs" to
supply southern Indian allies. In effect, Spain had won the last war
for West Florida but it had lost the peace. While Morales considered various measures of reorienting the Indian trade away from
the House of Panton, he saw no easy alternative. Bowles still lingered freely among the Lower Creeks and Seminoles-and there
would be no peace among those peoples while that "adventurer"
remained among them. Spanish respect to Panton, Leslie and
Company was still in order. Morales could only dream of a different world in which trade would be managed by persons capable of
instilling the Indians with "love and affection" toward the Spanish
king and nation. 82 That obligation lay beyond what Panton Leslie, and their successors were bound by oath and agreement to
perform.
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